Bhāratīya approach to Doubt, Logic, Debate, Interpretation, Reasoning and Knowledge
In the previous blog on Colonial and Post-Colonial Frameworks in Modern Bhārat, I discussed how influence does not operate through political and economic structures alone. It also operates through education, law, media, institutions and narratives shaping what society accepts as “modern”, “rational”, “progressive” and, importantly for this discussion, what it accepts as knowledge. Let's dive into Bhāratīya knowledge systems first so it lays a foundation before we examine other philosophical and political theories.
Ṣaḍdarśana (षड्दर्शन)
Ṣaṭ = six
Darśana = view, perspective, or a disciplined system of philosophical enquiry
Together, Ṣaḍdarśana refers to the six classical/orthodox (āstika) schools of Bhāratīya philosophy — those that accept the authority of the Veda, even while differing in method, categories, and conclusions. They are:
Sāṃkhya — attributed to Sage Kapila
Yoga — attributed to Sage Patañjali
Nyāya — attributed to Sage Gautama (Akṣapāda)
Vaiśeṣika — attributed to Sage Kaṇāda
Mīmāṃsā (Pūrva Mīmāṃsā) — attributed to Sage Jaimini
Vedānta (Uttara Mīmāṃsā) — traditionally attributed to Sage Bādarāyaṇa (Vyāsa), later developed into distinct sub-schools such as Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita.
Upfront note: I have intentionally not included Vedānta as a separate section in this article, because doing so would require presenting Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita on the self, Brahman, the world and liberation, which would take us away from the present enquiry. I will introduce each Vedāntic position where relevant. Understanding the remaining five darśanas first will also provide foundational methods for approaching Vedānta in addition to forming the basis of our belief system in our daily lives with greater care.
Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā examine the knower, means of knowledge, objects of knowledge, limitations of perception, mental error, critical reasoning, interpretation and the purpose of enquiry, to name a few – to ignite your curiosity in reading further.
Before proceeding to examine the individual theories listed in my earlier blog, I believe it is necessary to pause and raise a more fundamental question. It may appear to be a straightforward question, but think about it for a moment. How do we know what we know?
- Most of us believe and accept that the Earth revolves around the Sun. We receive this information through videos, movies, scientists, teachers, books and institutions. Have we personally observed the Earth travelling around the Sun? Why do we accept it?
- We believe that certain historical events occurred hundreds or thousands of years ago. We depend upon testimony/evidence from inscriptions, archaeological findings, authoritative documents, perhaps reliable oral traditions and historians. Were we present? Why do we believe and accept, well, some of it at least?
- We may watch a short video and conclude that a particular event occurred. Did we observe the complete event, or were we shown selected images accompanied by another person’s explanation?
- We also hold beliefs about our society, history, culture, Dharma and identity. How many have we independently examined? How many were inherited or taught to us? How many have been repeated so frequently that we can no longer distinguish the original information from the narrative subsequently built around it?
To get to the point, the inherent question I want you to consider is not only what do we know, but also some of the following:
1. Who is the knower?
2. What is the object being known?
3. Through what means is it known?
4. What is the source of this knowledge?
5. Is it reliable?
6. Why might something remain unperceived?
7. Could what appears be an error, memory or imagined construction?
8. Has an absence been established, or have we merely failed to perceive something?
9. What is the strongest opposing view?
10. Does the reasoning support the conclusion?
11. What purpose does resolving the question serve?
The point I am trying to impress upon you is that information is not automatically knowledge. Repetition is not proof. Institutional recognition is not automatically truth. Equally, something is not automatically true because it is traditional, nor false merely because it is ancient or religious.
How, then, should an enquiry be conducted?
Ancient Bhāratīya approach examined these questions. Darśana, derived from the Sanskrit root dṛś, to see, may be understood as a view or perspective or more put plainly – a disciplined approach to an enquiry into reality.
There are six astika darśanas (for the purpose of article we are excluding Vedanta) and they did not provide one identical answer. They engaged one another in fearless and rigorous debate, how reality can be known, what causes error, and what knowledge ultimately accomplishes (to name few), treating disagreement not as an obstacle, but as a means of refining their understanding of reality. Evidently, I am not presenting the following as one uniform “Indian method”. Instead, I am attempting to introduce the distinct contribution of each darśana towards a wider Bhāratīya framework of enquiry.
Pramāṇa and Prameya: The Basic Structure of Knowledge
Before examining the individual darśanas, a few Sanskrit terms are necessary:
Pramātṛ = the knower
Pramāṇa = the valid means or instrument of knowing
Prameya = the object to be known
Pramā or Pramiti = valid cognition or resulting knowledge
Prāmāṇya = validity
Aprāmāṇya = invalidity
In the example, if I see smoke and infer that there is a fire:
I am the pramātṛ, the knower. The fire is the prameya, the object to be known. Inference is the pramāṇa, the means through which it is known. The valid cognition that there is fire is pramā. Prāmāṇya is the cognition "there is fire on the hill" is valid because fire is actually present and the inference from real smoke was correctly made. Aprāmāṇya is if what I saw was actually mist, not smoke, and no fire exists there, the same cognition is invalid. A felt certainty that doesn't correspond to reality, i.e., error (viparyaya) rather than pramā.
The questions are not merely whether beliefs exist in the mind. The question is whether the cognition arose through a means capable of revealing the object accurately. The different darśanas offer different ways of arriving at valid means of knowledge, and taken together, they complement one another. This complementarity itself demonstrates that Bhāratīya philosophy did not merely give a list of beliefs for compulsory acceptance.
It investigated the very basis upon which a belief could become knowledge. When a biased view, potentially rooted in certain agendas, is presented and repeated as though it were neutral information, the absence of a discerning mind allows it to be absorbed uncritically - to say the least confuses the mind. Does this not need to be checked?
What follows are some methods and tools one may choose to use — to filter information, and to determine for oneself what is real. Does knowledge stop here, at the darśanas? No. They are a platform, not a destination — a station from which one may board the train of enquiry and travel onward to explore further stations of knowledge.
A. Sāṃkhya of Sage Kapila: The Knower and the Limits of Perception
Sage Kapila is traditionally regarded as the original teacher and founder of Sāṃkhya. The school’s early teachings are associated with a lineage through Kapila, Āsuri and Pañcaśikha. However, the earliest surviving text is the Sāṃkhya Kārikā composed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, who presents himself as transmitting that earlier tradition. Therefore, the teaching belongs to the Sāṃkhya tradition of Kapila, while the precise verses below cited to Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṃkhya Kārikā.
Sāṃkhya accepts three principal means of knowledge:
दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात् । त्रिविधं प्रमाणमिष्टं प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥ dṛṣṭam anumānam āptavacanaṃ ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt | trividhaṃ pramāṇam iṣṭaṃ prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇād dhi || 4 ||
Dṛṣṭa = directly seen or perceived
Anumāna = inference
Āpta-vacana = the statement of a competent and reliable person
Trividha = threefold
Pramāṇa = valid means of knowledge
Prameya = object to be known
Siddhi = establishment or ascertainment
Sāṃkhya also examines why something may not be perceived:
अतिदूरात् सामीप्यादिन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् । सौक्ष्म्याद् व्यवधानादभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥
atidūrāt sāmīpyād indriyaghātān mano’navasthānāt | saukṣmyād vyavadhānād abhibhavāt samānābhihārāc ca || 7 ||
The causes of non-perception include:
Atidūra = excessive distance
Sāmīpya = excessive proximity
Indriya-ghāta = impairment of the senses
Mano-anavasthāna = inattention or instability of the mind
Saukṣmya = subtlety
Vyavadhāna = obstruction
Abhibhava = being obscured or overpowered
Samānābhihāra = being mixed with something similar
Absence of perception is not automatically perception of absence. We cannot directly see gravity, radio waves, another person’s thoughts or an event occurring in a distant place. Their non-perception alone does not prove their non-existence. However, Sāṃkhya does not permit us to invent whatever we wish beyond perception, as an example, horns on a rabbit. What is not perceived must still be established through valid inference or reliable testimony.
B. Yoga of Sage Patañjali: Is Every Thought Knowledge?
Yoga Sūtra is attributed to Sage Patañjali. The text examines the operations of citta, the internal mental field, and the disciplined means through which its movements may be understood and restrained.
Sri Patañjali states (Yoga Sūtra 1.5–1.7.):
वृत्तयः पञ्चतय्यः क्लिष्टाक्लिष्टाः ॥ १.५ ॥ vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ || 1.5 ||
The movements of the mind are fivefold and may be afflicted or unafflicted.
Citta = the internal mental field or cognitive instrument
Vṛtti = movement, operation or modification
Pañcatayyaḥ = fivefold
Kliṣṭa = afflicted
Akliṣṭa = unafflicted
Patañjali then identifies these five movements:
प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्पनिद्रास्मृतयः ॥ १.६ ॥ pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ || 1.6 ||
Pramāṇa = valid cognition
Viparyaya = error or false cognition
Vikalpa = conceptual construction or imagination
Nidrā = sleep
Smṛti = memory
The three means of valid cognition are:
प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाः प्रमाणानि ॥ १.७ ॥ pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇāni || 1.7 ||
Pratyakṣa = direct perception
Anumāna = inference
Āgama = reliable testimony or authoritative communication
Not everything appearing in the mind is knowledge. A thought may be: valid cognition; a mistaken interpretation; imagination; memory; or several of these operating together.
A belief may feel convincing because it is emotionally powerful, repeatedly communicated, or consistent with what we already prefer to believe. Yet the strength of our conviction does not establish its truth. Consider the news articles, videos, and messages we encounter each day — the ones designed to pull or push our emotions. Because the message 'feels' valid, do we accept it as true?
Yoga therefore asks: Is this valid knowledge, or is it error, imagination or memory appearing as present knowledge?
C. Nyāya of Sage Gautama: The Complete Structure of Enquiry
Nyāya is traditionally attributed to Akṣapāda Gautama, author of the Nyāya Sūtra. It examines knowledge, doubt, inference, reasoning, debate, fallacy and the conditions under which a conclusion may be established. The opening sūtra identifies sixteen categories:
प्रमाणप्रमेयसंशयप्रयोजनदृष्टान्तसिद्धान्तावयवतर्कनिर्णयवादजल्पवितण्डाहेत्वाभासच्छलजातिनिग्रहस्थानानां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसाधिगमः ॥ pramāṇa-prameya-saṃśaya-prayojana-dṛṣṭānta-siddhāntāvayava-tarka-nirṇaya-vāda-jalpa-vitaṇḍā-hetvābhāsa-cchala-jāti-nigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ || 1.1.1||
The sixteen Nyāya padārthas are:
Pramāṇa = valid means of knowledge
Prameya = object of knowledge
Saṃśaya = doubt
Prayojana = purpose or motive
Dṛṣṭānta = familiar example
Siddhānta = established position
Avayava = components of an argument
Tarka = critical or hypothetical reasoning
Nirṇaya = ascertainment
Vāda = truth-directed discussion
Jalpa = disputation aimed at victory
Vitaṇḍā = attacking another position without establishing one’s own
Hetvābhāsa = an apparent but defective reason
Chala = quibble or deliberate misinterpretation
Jāti = futile or misleading rejoinder
Nigrahasthāna = point of defeat or failure in argument
Nyāya identifies four principal means of knowledge:
प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानि ॥ १.१.३ ॥ pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni || 1.1.3 ||
Pratyakṣa = perception
Anumāna = inference
Upamāna = comparison
Śabda = verbal testimony
Verbal testimony is defined as:
आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः ॥ १.१.७ ॥ āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ || 1.1.7 ||
Āpta = competent and reliable person
Upadeśa = communication or instruction
Śabda = verbal testimony
Human knowledge is dependent upon others. We cannot personally repeat every scientific experiment, examine every historical record or become experts in every subject.
The question: Is the speaker an āpta concerning this particular matter? (In this context, ask yourself, should you take my articles to be āpta? I entrust it to your own judgement. If you wish, let’s discuss).
Nyāya also presents five members of an argument:
Pratijñā = proposition
Hetu = reason
Udāharaṇa or Dṛṣṭānta = example and general relationship
Upanaya = application to the present case
Nigamana = conclusion
The classical example is:
There is fire on the hill. Because there is smoke. Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen. Such smoke is present on the hill. Therefore, there is fire on the hill.
Nyāya aska: What is being claimed, what is the source of knowledge, what reason supports it, and does the argument withstand examination and evidence?
D. Vaiśeṣika of Sage Kaṇāda: What Is It That We Know?
Vaiśeṣika is attributed to Sage Kaṇāda. The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra provides a classification of the objects and categories of reality. Before arguing about something, do we understand what kind of thing it is?
Is it:
Dravya = substance
Guṇa = quality
Karma = action or motion
Sāmānya = generality or common property
Viśeṣa = particularity
Samavāya = inherence or inseparable relationship
These are call the six categories of Vaiśeṣika darshana. The Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (Kaṇāda, Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 1.1.4.) states:
धर्मविशेषप्रसूताद् द्रव्यगुणकर्मसामान्यविशेषसमवायानां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तत्त्वज्ञानान्निःश्रेयसम् ॥ १.१.४ ॥ dharmaviśeṣa-prasūtād dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasam || 1.1.4 ||
Remaining words in the sutra are:
Padārtha = an object or category capable of being known and expressed
Sādharmya = similarity
Vaidharmya = difference
Tattva-jñāna = knowledge of the true nature
Niḥśreyasa = the highest good
Vaiśeṣikas discuss that if one person performs an action, the person is not identical to that action. Nor can that action automatically become a permanent quality of the person or a universal quality of the person’s entire community.
Abhāva = absence or non-existence (appears to be a later seventh category)
Aside from the original six, Abhāva was recognized as a seventh padārtha in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition. It should therefore not be presented as though it belonged to the original six-term enumeration of Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 1.1.4.
The addition of this seventh category unfolded into four distinct/additional forms:
Prāgabhāva = absence before production
Pradhvaṃsābhāva = absence after destruction
Atyantābhāva = absolute absence in a particular relation
Anyonyābhāva = mutual absence or one thing not being another
Vaiśeṣika therefore asks before reaching a conclusion, have we correctly distinguished substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, relationship, and absence?
Vaiśeṣika's question is not whether the claim is right or wrong. It is whether, before we accept or reject it, we have correctly separated the act from the actor, the actor from the attribute, the attribute from the universal, and the relationship as stated from the relationship as it actually was.
E. Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Sage Jaimini: How Is Meaning Established?
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is traditionally associated with Sage Jaimini, author of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. The school examines dharma, Vedic injunction, ritual action, language, interpretation and the validity of cognition.
Jaimini Maharishi's, Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. text begins:
अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १.१.१ ॥ athāto dharmajijñāsā || 1.1.1 ||
Atha = Thus/now
Ataḥ = therefore
Dharma = that which ought to be known and performed within this context
Jijñāsā = the desire to know or inquire or curiosity or investigation
The important word is jijñāsā. The text begins with enquiry and not with a hypothesis. A Mīmāṃsā-style unit of enquiry, developed through its commentarial method, may include:
Viṣaya vākya = subject or statement
Saṃśaya = doubt
Pūrvapakṣa = opposing position
Uttara-pakṣa = response
Siddhānta = reasoned conclusion
Ākṣepa = objection raised against the response
Samādhāna = resolution of that objection
The major Mīmāṃsā traditions differ over the number of pramāṇas. The Prābhākara tradition accepts perception, inference, comparison, testimony and postulation. The Bhāṭṭa tradition accepts these and adds non-apprehension as a distinct means of knowing absence.
Arthāpatti = necessary postulation
Anupalabdhi = non-apprehension under conditions appropriate for knowing absence
Mīmāṃsā also states:
Svataḥ-prāmāṇya = intrinsic or prima facie validity of cognition
Aprāmāṇya = invalidity
Bādhā = defeat or correction of cognition
Doṣa = defect contributing to error
Its basic question is:
Must every cognition be separately certified before it can guide knowledge and action, or does cognition possess initial authority unless defeated? Mīmāṃsā asks: What is the subject, why has doubt arisen, what does the statement mean, what is the opposing position, and what conclusion survives examination?
Bringing the Darśanas Together
The five Darśanas developed distinct yet complementary approaches to questions of reality, knowledge and error, providing methods and analytical tools that are also employed in the different Vedāntic traditions to examine and establish their respective positions. Their contributions may be broadly summarised as follows:
- Sāṃkhya: What are the knower and instruments of cognition, and why might something remain unperceived?
- Yoga: Is the mental activity knowledge, error, imagination or memory?
- Nyāya: What is the source of knowledge, what supports the claim, and does the reasoning survive?
- Vaiśeṣika: What kind of object, quality, action, relationship or absence is being examined?
- Mīmāṃsā: What does the statement mean, how should opposing interpretations be examined, and how is a conclusion established?
This is why the Bhāratīya knowledge systems remain relevant philosophical systems as they can inform how we approach questions in everyday life. Sometimes the conclusion may simply be: The matter has not yet been established. That is not necessarily a failure. Recognising the limits of what can presently be known—and being willing to leave a question open until sufficient grounds for a conclusion emerge—may itself be a form of intellectual progress.
Concluding thoughts: As we proceed to examine Western theories and their application to Bhārat, it is pertinent to have a grounding in our own systems, so that we can better examine how these theories may be understood, assessed and applied. This approach is not contrary to the Bhāratīya tradition itself. The Ṛg Veda states:
आ नो भद्राः क्रतवो यन्तु विश्वतः ॥ ā no bhadrāḥ kratavo yantu viśvataḥ|| Ṛg Veda 1.89.1
The intent, therefore, is not to reject a theory merely because it originated elsewhere. It would be equally insufficient to accept it merely because it carries the approval of certain universities, institutions, media organisations or political groups. The objective is also not to replace Western view with unexamined Bhāratīya view, nor to reject knowledge from outside Bhārat. The objective is to recover the Bhāratīya capacity to inquire, interpret, reason, debate, correct and contribute to human knowledge. Before arriving at a siddhānta, a reasoned conclusion, the various filters and methods discussed in this article must first be brought to bear.
This, in my view, is the beginning of cognitive sovereignty: not automatically accepting what is imported, not blindly protecting what is inherited, but developing the capacity to determine what should be accepted, corrected, adapted, rejected or presently left undecided.
I hope this article provides a basis for exploring Indian philosophical topics and concepts more deeply. It is intended not as a conclusion, but as a starting point from which these ideas may be explored, applied in daily life, and used to further one’s growth in knowledge and understanding.
More in next…
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